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1. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK,
AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989).
The book refutes to incredulity the assumptions from which many “armchair theories” of
bankruptcy and proposals for reform derive.  Id. at 335.
2. See id. at pt. I (describing a highly diverse and complex consumer bankruptcy debtor
population in rebuttal of stereotypes).
3. “Now, instead of all Americans taxing themselves to provide a good education for all
children, parents are left to opt-in to a decent school by paying for an expensive home — if they
can.”  Elizabeth Warren, Families Alone: The Changing Economics of Rearing Children, 58
OKLA. L. REV. 551, 569 (2005).
XXxI am struck by the perversity of funding public education indirectly through home
mortgages — spending one’s way into a better school district, as it were, rather than investing
directly to improve the worse ones.  This is the bizarre evolution to which I refer. Presumably,
where the public school system fails to provide what is believed to be the right sort of
educational opportunities, the burden falls to the family to find another way.  See id. at 556-58.
That other way, it would seem, is to move to good schools rather than to make worse schools
better.  See id. at 567-69.  In light of the resultant staggering debt and annual bankruptcy filings,
that burden is apparently more than the family can bear.  See id. at 569.  Yet there seems to be
no end in sight, just interminable rounds of overborrowing, excessive debt levels, default,
foreclosure, and bankruptcy.
4. For instance, family housing upgrades do not consist of extra leisure space, hot tubs,
or fancy designer appliances.  Id. at 562.  Rather, they appear to consist of practical
improvements.  Id.; see also SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 188-89
(stating that credit card “junkies” represent a relatively small fraction of consumer bankruptcy
debtors).
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REPLY TO ELIZABETH WARREN
STEVE KNIPPENBERG*
Professor Warren’s empirical work is always disarming.   It wrenches us1
from the moorings of comfortable suppositions, threatening what we have
always believed about debt and what debtors are like.   Hers, like any2
empirical work, is unforgiving, exposing the stories and images that are the
conceptual bases of our understanding of borrowing and borrowers as
apocryphal.  Families Alone chronicles a bizarre evolution in the “financing”
of public education  and, in the process, paints a surprising portrait of the3
consumer debtor in bankruptcy.  The resulting likeness bears little resemblance
to familiar caricatures of irresponsible, credit-card-slinging hedonists obsessed
with the trappings of opulence which they enjoy immediately on the strength
of empty promises to pay later.   The latter profile still pervades the popular4
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5. See Geoff Giles, The New Bankruptcy Reform Law: Bad News for Debtors, Worse News
for Lawyers, NEV. LAW., Sept. 2005, at 8, 9 (“It [the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act] has been sponsored, promoted and lobbied by various creditor’s
groups, all of whom suppose that it will diminish the losses that they perceive have been
directly related to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.”).
6. See Warren, supra note 3, at 551-52.
7. Id. at 574 (“According to a recent survey, 97% of Americans agree that a college degree
is ‘absolutely necessary’ or ‘helpful,’ compared with a scant 3% claiming that a degree is ‘not
that important.’”).
8. Id. at 551 (“[W]hat constitutes a basic education has shifted as well.  In a single
generation, American families’ view of a core education has expanded to include two years of
preschool and four years of college.  In effect, the years of basic formal education have grown
from thirteen to nineteen . . . .”).
9. Id. at 571.
10. Id. at 571-73.
11. Id. at 571.
12. Id. at 579 (“[F]or more than a century America has taxed all of her citizens — including
the childless — to offer a free, basic education to every child.”).
13. Id. at 555-58.
14. Id. at 558-60.
15. Id. at 556-58, 559-60.
consciousness, and it is the story told by creditors who lobby to limit access
to the safe harbor of bankruptcy.5
Families Alone tells a very different story of debtors in bankruptcy and the
kind of borrowing that lands them there.  These debtors consist in large
measure of middle-class, backbone of America families desperate to educate
their children from near cradle to early adulthood.   By popular consensus, it6
seems there can be no real success, no meaningful accomplishment, without
a college degree,  and the sooner one begins preparing to get one the better.7 8
“Sooner” means that an academic career begins before elementary school.9
Once thought of as interludes in the day of children otherwise frittering their
time away at home, kindergarten and preschool have become critical
educational episodes, requisite steps along the path to a college education.10
The costs at both ends have traditionally been borne by families, by the parents
who decided to have children for whatever reasons.11
Then there are the years between preschool and college, the years spent in
public school — in elementary school, and perhaps middle and high school.
The cost of these important in-between years is nominally a public cost, borne
alike by taxpayers with children and those without.   Alarming disparities in12
the quality  and even the safety  of public schools, Professor Warren points13 14
out, have driven families with children to shop for the best school districts.15
District-shopping necessarily entails living in the school district of choice,
and so requires the purchase of a home in neighborhoods privileged with the
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16. Id. at 561.
17. Id. at 564.
18. Id. at 564-65, 569.
19. Id. at 579 (“[O]ver the past generation, the family has traveled backwards — fast.
Today’s parents are asked to bear individually a much larger share of the cost of raising their
children . . . .”).
20. Id. at 571 (“With mom in the workforce and the family located ever further from the
city’s center, that second car became the only means for running errands, earning a second
income, and getting by in the far-flung suburbs.”).
21. Id. at 567-68.
22. Id. at 576 (“Over the past generation, families with children have increased their
spending in five basic categories: homes, cars, daycare, tuition, and health insurance.”).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 578 (“[B]y the time they make five basic payments — mortgage, car, daycare,
tuition and health insurance — today’s two-income family has less money than its one-income
counterpart of a generation ago.  Increases in those five expenses have eaten up the entire net
take home pay of a working mother — and more.  Any additional costs — time off from work
to care for a sick child, increased expenses for work clothes for two adults — must be squeezed
somewhere else in the budget.  Given these high fixed expenses, the rise in home mortgage
foreclosures, bankruptcies, credit card defaults, and other signs of financial distress are
unsurprising.”).
best public schools.   Naturally, the supply of homes in public-school-16
advantaged districts is limited, while the demand is urgent and insatiable in
keeping with what is at stake.   And, naturally, the cost to families of17
relocating in premier neighborhoods — premier because of the school districts
which encompass them — reflects that supply and demand.   Again, at stake18
is the lifetime well-being of the child, the centerpiece of the family and its
most precious commodity, so that the crushing weight of a massive mortgage
will never be sufficiently daunting to deter the decision to buy one’s way into
the best school districts possible.
So, the cost of public education has been reallocated, with families with
children to educate doing the heavy financial lifting.   But this is only the19
beginning: there are accessories and attachments that must be had in pursuit
of the dream school.  For instance, there is the second car to transport a second
working spouse to the job,  working for the second income needed to qualify20
for a colossal mortgage.   Add inflation to the cost of other “basic21
categories,”  and the financial squeeze on the family electing to have children22
becomes frightening.   Default, foreclosure on first and second mortgages, and23
bankruptcy may be disturbing by their very nature but, under the
aforementioned conditions, hardly remarkable.24
Professor Warren makes the case that excessive borrowing leading to
financial collapse and bankruptcy is attributable in large part to massive home
mortgages and associated debt incurred not to acquire extravagances, but to
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25. See supra text accompanying note 4.
26. This ubiquitous phrase is frequently traced to Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934), but can be found in earlier cases.  Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1047 n.1 (1987).  The stereotype has been central
in the conceptual shaping of the fresh start in bankruptcy.  Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims
of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 243 n.42 (1995) [hereinafter Ponoroff &
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert].
27. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 8 (“Most people would be moved
by the plight of a steelworker laid off after years of service, depleted of savings, unable to find
a job, and worried to distraction about feeding a family.”); see Adam Feibelman, Defining the
Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 134
(2005).  See generally Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy:
A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49 (1986) (discussing
the importance of the honest-but-unfortunate image of debtors to the “fresh start” policy in
consumer bankruptcy law).
28. The model has been expressed variously as public assistance, insurance, and a social
safety net.  See, e.g., Barry Adler, Ben Polak & Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer
Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (2000) (likening bankruptcy
relief to wage insurance); Feibelman, supra note 27, at 132; Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in
the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related
Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 307 (1995) (referring to
bankruptcy as “analogous to the welfare system” and to “social insurance for the nonpoor”).
See Hallinan, supra note 27, for an extended discussion of the many models used to represent
consumer bankruptcy.
29. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 8-9 (discussing the moral
dimension of consumer bankruptcy).  The essence of a public assistance model is distinguishing
the worthy from the unworthy, and the essence of that distinction is finding, or not finding,
fault.  Id.; see also Ponoroff & Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert, supra note 26, at 244
(explaining that the propriety of debtor’s conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt assets on
the eve of bankruptcy is tested based on debtor’s intent).
finance the education of children of middle-class families.  Discourse on
consumer bankruptcy generally proceeds from two conceptual categories
defined by opposing prototypes.  The credit drunk alluded to earlier — who
borrows irresponsibly or worse, fraudulently — is the prototype of one
conceptual category.   The other category is associated with the familiar25
phrase “honest-but-unfortunate debtor,”  a shorthand reference to the other26
prototype that is perhaps best represented by the debtor whose income is lost
or diminished owing to injury, a long- or short-term debilitating medical
condition, or loss of employment.27
The figures of the honest-but-unfortunate debtor and the irresponsible
debtor are creatures of a public assistance model of bankruptcy.   Likening28
bankruptcy to public assistance requires a determination of the relief-
worthiness of debtors to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving.   The29
two categories of debtors embody that distinction, and it is around those
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/2
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30. See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
31. For instance, 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000), amended by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, contains exceptions to the discharge of debts where credit
was obtained by the debtor’s fraud, and debtors who abuse the bankruptcy process may be
denied a Chapter 7 discharge altogether under section 707.
32. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 9.
33. Id. at 8 (“The [bankruptcy] cases in our files suggest endless combinations of
irresponsibility, misfortune, and fault.”).
conceptual categories that rules pertaining to granting or denying relief
cluster.   For instance, rules pertaining to dismissal and global or partial denial30
of the discharge are, in general, calculated to withhold bankruptcy relief from
debtors thought to belong to the irresponsible debtor category,  while rules31
granting relief, principally the discharge, exist for the honest-but-unfortunate
debtor.
In its empirical revelations about debtors in bankruptcy, Families Alone
counsels that many, perhaps most debtors in fact, fit squarely within neither
debtor category.  It strikes me as singular that bankruptcy policy and the rules
that follow from it seem to be premised on prototype extremes, on conceptual
categories only marginally representative of the factual circumstances of
consumer debtors.  What is more important in Professor Warren’s revelations,
in my view, is the latent indictment of the public assistance metaphor.32
The public assistance model is a landscape populated with the deserving,
the undeserving, and the more or less deserving.   Irresponsible debtors, of33
course, are the cause of their own financial predicament, and should be denied
relief or perhaps even access to the bankruptcy process.  By contrast, the
honest-but-unfortunate debtor’s distress is not of his or her own making, and
such debtors should have access to bankruptcy and the relief available there.
In either case, debt causes bankruptcy, borrowing creates debt, and debtors do
the borrowing; so debtors of both sorts are the cause of bankruptcy.  On the
public assistance account, it is simply a matter of distinguishing those worthy
of assistance, in the form of bankruptcy relief, from the unworthy.
Doubtless, those debtors closely approximating the caricature of the
irresponsible debtor prototype should not escape their obligations in
bankruptcy, and those debtors squarely within the honest-but-unfortunate
category should be granted relief.  But as Families Alone demonstrates, we
have seen that many real debtors in bankruptcy are not so easily categorized,
and a model predicated on sorting the worthy from the unworthy flounders
where the line between them is blurred.  Either there must be much
handwringing about how those debtors should be categorized, or it must be
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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34. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE AND MIND
(2001); Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property
and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV 305 (1999); F. Stephen Knippenberg, Future Nonadvance
Obligations: Preferences Lost in Metaphor, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1537 (1994); Ponoroff &
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert, supra note 26; Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen
Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the Irresistible Force: Rethinking the Relationship
Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2234 (1997) [hereinafter
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, The Immovable Object].
35. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 122-25 (1980).
36. Id.  For an overview of metaphoric reasoning, see Knippenberg, supra note 34, at 1561-
71.
37. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 115.
38. See id. at 7-9, 42-43, 145.
39. See id. at 9, 145.
acknowledged that the public assistance metaphor is not equipped to inform
their predicament.
To say the public assistance model has little to contribute to the discourse
about the crisis outlined by Professor Warren is not to say the model is not
useful; rather, it is only to concede that a conceptualization of bankruptcy
exclusively within the public assistance model cannot illuminate every aspect
of the concept of bankruptcy.  I have referred to that conceptualization of
bankruptcy as metaphoric.  The following part offers a brief discussion of
what is meant here by metaphoric reasoning and its significance to law
transformation generally, and the public assistance metaphor in particular, in
light of Professor Warren’s work.
It’s Just a Metaphor, After All
A small but growing body of scholarly work has deployed insights from the
cognitive sciences in aid of law and legal policy analysis.   Perhaps the most34
important of those insights is the identification of the central role of
imaginative conceptual devices, principally metaphoric reasoning, in human
conceptual systems.35  Simply put, all but rudimentary human concepts are
metaphoric.   Metaphoric reasoning takes ill-delineated target concepts36
lacking natural dimensions of their own and makes them meaningful by
recourse to well-delineated and more fully understood source concepts.   For37
instance, an elaborate array of metaphors define the human concept time,
which is understood variously as a moving object, a valuable resource, and a
linear path along which we move from past toward the future.38
Understanding the target concept, time, in terms of the well-delineated
concept, valuable resource, enables meaning in our practical experience of
time for some purposes.   For other aspects of the way in which we experience39
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40. See id. at 46.  Generally, the more important the concept, the more likely it will be
highly developed.  The concept idea, for example, is highly elaborated through at least ten
ontological metaphors.  Id. at 46-48.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 10.
43. That is to say, understanding one concept in terms of another generates entailments, or
inferential consequences.  An extended discussion of entailments is offered in MARK JOHNSON,
THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON 130-38
(1987).
44. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 9.
45. Id. at 10.  Metaphoric reasoning highlights shared dimensions but eclipses asymmetries.
46. Id.
47. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, The Immovable Object, supra note 34, at 2282-84.
time, alternative metaphors are deployed so that we might quantify and
otherwise reason about time.40
The essence of metaphoric reasoning, then, is the understanding of one
concept in terms of another, different concept.   It entails cognitive41
appreciation of shared dimensions among source and target concepts such that
similarities between them are highlighted.   Reasoning about an ill-delineated42
target concept is possible because of metaphoric mapping, whereby epistemic
consequences are carried from the source concept to the target concept.   For43
example, with the metaphoric concept, time-is-a-resource, epistemic
consequences associated with the source concept, resources, are mapped onto
the target concept, time.  A culturally important aspect of the way we
experience time is thus made meaningful.  Such it is that time can be saved,
squandered, put to good use, wasted, and so forth.44
Whereas metaphoric reasoning highlights shared dimensions among
concepts, differences are hidden or conceptually subordinated in the glare of
similarities.   Metaphoric highlighting and hiding follow necessarily from45
understanding one concept in terms of another, different concept.   The46
phenomenon of hiding is not a shortcoming or deficiency of metaphoric
reasoning, just a necessary concomitant.  But failing to acknowledge it, and so
differences between concepts, limits analysis to the terms of the metaphor.47
Understanding bankruptcy in terms of public assistance makes sense.  The
metaphor highlights an important shared dimension between the concepts in
aid of meaning, and so offers a basis for reasoning about bankruptcy policy to
that extent.  However, it is one thing to say consumer bankruptcy can usefully
be understood in terms of public assistance for some purposes, but something
else again to say consumer bankruptcy is public assistance.  On conflation of
the two concepts, distinctions are lost, with significant consequences for both
law transformation and development of bankruptcy policy.  In particular, a
conceptualization of bankruptcy based on the concept of public assistance
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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48. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 9; cf. Ponoroff &
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert, supra note 26, at 243-44 (proposing that the term “honest-
but-unfortunate debtor” is too indeterminate to be of use in determining the legitimacy of
prebankruptcy asset conversion).
49. I do not make this observation lightly.  Consider the connotations ordinarily associated
with the root, credit: one earns credit; we give credit where credit is due.  One might be a credit
to her profession, and we earn credits in the course of our education.  On the other hand,
consider the connotations associated with the root, debt.  It suggests obligation and burden, and
in debt is not a place many of us like to be.
50. See Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 431 N.E.2d 920, 924 (Mass. 1982) (distinguishing
vendors of alcohol from social hosts).  These represent one statement of the policy bases for
confines analysis to discussion of debtors, deciding which are deserving of
assistance and which are not.
Indeed, a public assistance model cannot address the financial crisis
Families Alone reports on any but its own terms.  It is calculated to do no more
than grant or deny bankruptcy relief in the same manner any public benefit is
awarded, based on some combination of need and desert.  The debtors
Professor Warren identifies are significantly representative of those seeking
bankruptcy relief, yet they are not easily categorized with confidence.  It is
difficult to see how struggling to categorize those debtors as ethically worthy
of relief — the exercise required under the public assistance model — could
yield a productive response to the financial crisis Professor Warren brings to
light.48
Thus far, there has been no mention of a vital agency at work in the crisis
reported in Families Alone.  By hypothesis, lending contributes to debt in
precise dollar-for-dollar proportion to borrowing.  The agency at work, then,
is the lending community, without which there can be no borrowing, no debt,
no default, and no bankruptcy.  Neither could there be excessive borrowing
without excessive, perhaps irresponsible, lending.  Understanding consumer
bankruptcy exclusively in terms of public assistance, however, conceptually
precludes a role for lenders — there are no debtees,  only debtors.49
Concepts of experiential importance and manifold utility are ordinarily
understood in terms of multiple metaphors to offer a range of perspectives and
thereby enrich meaning.  Additional metaphors to compliment the public
assistance metaphor would likewise clear the way for broader analysis of
consumer bankruptcy.  The proposal offered here is a complimentary metaphor
that takes account of the role of lenders, which is lost under a public assistance
model.  Focusing on lenders mitigates the need for fastidious attention on
motivations for overborrowing and making judgments about a borrower’s
choices.  Consider the following dimensions of a concept found in another
context, the imposition of liability on vendors of alcohol for injuries to third
persons caused by their patrons while intoxicated.  Vendors and servers:50
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Dram Shop liability.  I do not offer an extended discussion of Dram Shop liability here, but, in
a forthcoming article, Dean Lawrence Ponoroff and I propose that Dram Shop concepts might
be usefully deployed as a basis for equitable subordination of claims in bankruptcy.  A first-rate
overview of Dram Shop acts can be found in Richard Smith, Note, A Comparative Analysis of
Dramshop Liability and a Proposal for Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP L. 553 (2000).  For an
interesting treatment of Dram Shop liability from an economics perspective, complete with a
survey of bar owners, see Frank A. Sloan, Lan Liang, Emily M. Stout & Kathryn Whetten-
Goldstein, Liability, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J.L. & ECON. 473 (2000).
51. Importing the concept of Dram Shop liability into the credit context is not so
revolutionary as one might suppose.  In an analogous situation, securities brokers have been
held liable for client losses for failure to supervise in Dram Shop fashion.  See Lewis D.
Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Beyond Precedent: Arbitral Extensions of Securities Law, 57
BUS. LAW. 999, 1011-13 (2002).  Dram Shop principles have also been introduced in the
discussion of liability of media defendants where adolescent viewers have committed violent
acts, see Amanda Harmon Cooley, They Fought the Law and the Law (Rightfully) Won: The
Unsuccessful Battle to Impose Tort Liability upon Media Defendants for Violent Acts of
Mimicry Committed by Teenage Viewers, 5 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 203, 225-26 (2004),
as well as the discussion of the gambling industry’s liability for game addiction, see John
Warren Kindt, “The Insiders” for Gambling Lawsuits: Are the Games “Fair” and Will Casinos
and Gambling Facilities Be Easy Targets for Blueprints for RICO and Other Causes of Action?,
55 MERCER L. REV. 529, 542-43, 555-56, 572-75 (2004).
! have financial incentive to encourage their patrons to drink
! are in a position to monitor their patrons’ consumption
! are experienced in recognizing intoxication
! are in control of the alcohol they dispense, and may refuse service to
! patrons
The characteristics of commercial vendors of alcohol which help explain Dram
Shop liability bear striking resemblance to salient features of consumer
lenders.  Taking those features bullet-by-bullet, consumer lenders: 
! have financial incentive to encourage consumer borrowing
! are uniquely positioned to observe borrower credit habits, purchases,
! and the like
! are experienced in irresponsible borrowing and default
! are in complete control of the credit they dispense to consumer
! borrowers
The common dimensions of the two conceptual categories — vendors of
alcohol and vendors of credit — are a provocative invitation to conceptualize
the one, lenders, in terms of the other, vendors of alcohol.   The metaphor is51
natural, indicating the potential utility in understanding lenders dispensing
consumer credit in terms of vendors dispensing alcohol to imbibing patrons.
By virtue of its novel perspective on the concept of bankruptcy, the “Dram
Shop metaphor” introduces analytic possibilities unavailable under the public
assistance metaphor with its exclusive focus upon debtors.  In particular, the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
596 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  58:587
52. Nevertheless, as Professor Warren points out, it seems the suggestion has occasionally
been made.  See Warren, supra note 3, at 579-81 (citing ELINOR BURKETT, THE BABY BOON:
HOW FAMILY FRIENDLY AMERICA CHEATS THE CHILDLESS 197 (2000)).
Dram Shop metaphor turns attention upon creditors and opens the way to
consideration of their role in the financial morass identified in Families Alone.
This is not to assert that the Dram Shop metaphor should be pressed into
service where the public assistance metaphor will do, in the cases of the
irresponsible debtor prototype on the one hand, and honest-but-unfortunate
debtor prototype on the other.  But Families Alone connotes that the public
assistance metaphor is inadequate to explain or address a large number of
debtors in bankruptcy who cannot readily be assigned to either debtor type.
Any suggestion that the decision to have children and educate them in
accordance with current trends aligns those debtors with the irresponsible
debtor prototype is insipid.   These are not the credit drunks at whom we wag52
our fingers in righteous indignation.  At the same time, even if it is laudable
for such debtors to take enormous financial risk in the form of massive
mortgages to maximize educational opportunities for their children, it does not
seem to irrefutably qualify them for membership in the honest-but-unfortunate
debtor category relative to the category prototype.
The nature of this reply does not permit the development of the Dram Shop
metaphor proposed or elaboration of its implications, but it does allow for
inauguration of the metaphor as a vehicle for discourse.  One singular
implication is immediately evident, however, and can be briefly stated:
mapping the epistemic consequences associated with the Dram Shop concept
onto bankruptcy and lender concepts points to the imposition of liability or,
more properly, responsibility, for imprudent lending and debtor financial
suicide on creditors.  Again, there can be no risky borrowing without risky
lending.  The Dram Shop metaphor simply takes notice of lending and thereby
enables dialogue about the lending community as a contributing cause of
bankruptcy.   Discourse on default and bankruptcy is no longer confined to
assessment of debtor behavior and borrowing practices.
The solution to the economic crisis identified in Families Alone is illusive
because current conceptual models at the basis of our understanding of the
bankrupt debtor are inadequate.  A critique that begins and ends with a public
assistance mindset is inadequate because it is committed to judging the
propriety of borrowing to ascertain whether a debtor is near enough to either
the honest-but-unfortunate or irresponsible debtor category to warrant
membership in one or the other.  The endeavor is futile in the face of debtors
who defy categorization, such as those identified in Families Alone, and that
alone suggests the scope of analysis be expanded.  A complementary model,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/2
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such as the Dram Shop metaphor, expands analysis in the quest for solutions.
Families Alone is disquieting in its revelations about the nature of debtors and
the reasons many borrow themselves into bankruptcy, but it is also a call to
action, a call to reconsider the fundamental ways in which we think about
bankrupt debtors and, at long last, creditors.
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